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CORRUPT PRACTICES IN INDIA: No PAYOFF

I. INTRODUCTION

Foreign investors constantly seek new business locations to
increase profits and decrease expenses. With one of the fastest
growing economies in the world, India is a popular site for foreign
investment. 1 India, however, suffers from a major problem which
A Gallup survey
threatens U.S. investment-corruption.
conducted throughout India reported that corruption is one of the
most serious problems plaguing the country. 2 India's current anticorruption laws are ineffective; hence, U.S. corporations find it
increasingly difficult to follow the requirements of the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) while doing business in
'3
India, "one of the most corrupt countries in the world."
This comment analyzes the FCPA and its relationship to
foreign investment in India. Part II describes the inception,
structure, and provisions of the FCPA, including the anti-bribery
and accounting provisions. In addition, it focuses on the 1988
Amendments' effect on FCPA provisions, defenses, and penalties.
Part III explores the interests and benefits of foreign investment in
India. Part IV discusses corruption and the causes of corruption in
India, Indian laws dealing with corruption and bribery and the
effect of corruption on foreign investment in India's
telecommunication and power sector. Part V discusses the
benefits and burdens of the FCPA on U.S. investors. Part VI
analyzes the feasibility of current efforts in India to combat
corruption. Finally, Part VII proposes alternative solutions for
foreign investors to the Indian corruption problem.

1. See India's Economic Nationalists, THE ECONOMIST (UK), Aug. 12, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 9570136. "Industrial output-growth averaged 8.4% in 1994-95;
exports were up by 27% over a year earlier in the April-June quarter of this year (1995);
inflation has dipped below 10%." Id
2 See Indians Trust Armed Forces, Supreme Court; No Faith in Police, INDIA
JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1996, at A4.

3. Rahul Bedi, Greed Achieves Recognition, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 18,
1996, availablein 1996 WL 3762224.
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II. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. History and Structure of the FCPA
In response to numerous scandals, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) began investigating questionable
These
payments to foreign officials by U.S. Companies. 4
investigations revealed that over 400 U.S. companies, including
many Fortune 500 companies, admitted making over $300 million
in illegal payments to foreign government officials, politicians, and
political parties. 5 In response, Congress enacted the FCPA.6 The
FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign government officials, requires
additional accounting measures, and grants joint enforcement
7
responsibilities to the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Under the FCPA, it is unlawful to make a payment to a
foreign official for the purpose of influencing the official to act in
the company's favor. 8 The requisite knowledge is established if
the company or individual "is aware of a high probability of the
existence of [the] circumstances [for improper payment]." 9
Knowing or having reason to know that the recipient will use all or
any portion of the payment to bribe foreign officials is a violation
under the FCPA. 10
The "reason to know" requirement is characterized as one
of the most ambiguous and controversial parts of the FCPA, 11 in
part because it is measured by both an objective and subjective
standard. 12
This proves problematic, especially for U.S.
companies, because doing business in foreign nations decreases
their control over intermediaries who may potentially engage in
4. See generally S.E.C., 94th CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter

ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N].

5. See

HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL

CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).

6. See id.
7. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1464 (1977) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988)) [hereinafter FCPA].
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1) to (2).
9. See id- § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
10. See id.§ 78ff(a)
11. See John E. Impert, A Programfor Compliance with the Foreign CorruptPractices
Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009, 1015
(1990); see also, Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1988: Clarificationor Evisceration?,20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 447,448 (1989).
12. See Bliss & Spak, supra note 12, at 448.
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bribery. Thus, business executives argue that an objective "reason
to define in the
to know" standard is impractical and difficult
13
transactions.
business
context of international
(1)
The FCPA is composed of three main sections:
15 and (3)
14
provisions,
accounting
(2)
provisions,
antibribery
penalty provisions. 16 The FCPA provisions apply equally to
officers, directors, stockholders, agents, and employees of a
company. 17 Notably, foreign officials 18who receive the bribes,
however, are not liable under the FCPA.
B. FCPA Anti-Bribery Provision
The anti-bribery provision of the FCPA has five elements. 19
It prohibits U.S. companies from using interstate commerce to pay
foreign officials for the purpose of influencing that official for the
purpose of obtaining or retaining business. 20 The anti-bribery
provision applies to both domestic concerns and SEC reporting
A domestic concern includes any
companies or issuers. 21
individual, citizen, or resident of the United States. 22 It also
includes any business entity, incorporated or conducting business
13. See id.
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a) to -2(a).
15. See id. § 78m(a)-(b).
16. See id. §§ 78dd-l(d), 78ff(b)-(c).
17. See id § 78ff(c)(2)(B)-(C).
18. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831,832 (5th Cir. 1990).
19. The relevant provisions provide:
(1) makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce;
(2) corruptly in furtherance of an offer, gift, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money or anything of value;
(3) to any "foreign official," foreign political party, foreign political party
official, or candidates for office (collectively, "foreign recipient"), or to any
person while "knowing" that all or a part of the thing will be offered to a foreign
recipient;
(4) for the purpose of influencing any official act or decision or inducing the
foreign recipient to act in violation of his lawful duty, or induce such recipient to
use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality to affect any
decision of that government or instrumentality;
(5) in order to assist the public company or domestic concern in obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)-(2) to -1(d)(2).
20. See Delia Poon, Note, Exposure to the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct A Guide for
US. Companies With Activities in the People's Republic of China to Minimize Liability, 19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 327,332 (1996).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2(h)(1).
22. See id § 78dd-2(h)(1).
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23
principally in the United States.
Although the FCPA initially appears straightforward and
inflexible, significant exemptions and ambiguities exist. For
example, the antibribery provision exempts certain payments from
liability, such as the "grease payments" exception. These are
payments made to facilitate or expedite the performance of
"routine governmental actions" by a foreign official.2 4 Another
exemption includes payments made to foreign officials performing
"ministerial or clerical" duties. 25 The FCPA, however, prohibits
payments made to a foreign official whose duties involve decision
making. Thus, the Act essentially allows bribes to a secretary or
clerk to hasten permit-processing, but prohibits bribing a foreign
minister to secure a contract. In practice, U.S. business executives,
as well as the SEC, find it difficult to distinguish between an
allowable "grease payment" and a prohibited bribe under the
26
FCPA.

C. FCPA Accounting Provision
The accounting provision supplements the anti-bribery
provision of the FCPA and it applies to SEC reporting
companies. 27 It was enacted to make it difficult for companies to
maintain and conceal "slush" funds. 28 The SEC reported that
many companies maintain "slush" funds outside their books for
use in bribing foreign officials. 29 Thus, the accounting provision
requires every issuer who has certain classes of shares registered
with the SEC: (1) to make and keep books, records, and accounts,
that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company; and (2)
to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances30 that the following
objectives are satisfied: (a) corporate assets and transactions are
safeguarded from unauthorized use; (b) corporate transactions
conform to managerial authorizations; and (c) corporate records
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) to 2(b).
See id § 78dd-l(a)(3); Impert, supra note 11, at 1015.
See Impert, supra note 11, at 1015.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6).
See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, supra note 4, at 48.
See id. at 37-38.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (emphasis added).
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are accurate. 31 These requirements ensure accountability for any
32
illegal payments made to government officials.
The FCPA defines reasonable detail and reasonable
assurance as "the level of detail and degree of assurance as would
satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs. ' 33 The
SEC has commented that the reasonableness standard allows
'34
"flexibility in responding to particular facts and circumstances."
A materiality standard is, therefore, inappropriate to determine
either the accuracy of corporate records or the effectiveness of
35
internal corporate control.
The accounting provision provides a safe harbor exemption
for U.S. parent companies that do not have a majority ownership
interest in their subsidiaries or affiliates. 36
Compliance is
presumed when a U.S. issuer holds a minority of the voting shares
of its foreign subsidiary, and the U.S. parent company
demonstrates a good faith effort to cause its subsidiary to comply
with the FCPA accounting provision. 37 The good faith effort,
however, must be reasonable under the circumstances. The
reasonableness of the effort is determined by examining: (1) the
relative degree of the issuer's ownership, and (2) the laws and
practices governing business operations of the country where the
subsidiary is located. 38
D. 1988 Amendments to the FCPA
Due to ambiguities and controversies surrounding certain
sections of the FCPA, Congress amended it as part of the 1988
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988 Amendments). 39
The 1988 Amendments primarily affected the knowledge
requirement, the definition of grease payment, the affirmative
defenses to the FCPA, and the penalties under the FCPA.40
31. See SEC Chairman Harold Williams, Address Before the SEC Developments
Conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Jan. 29, 1981), in
46 Fed. Reg. 11544, 11546-47 (1981) [hereinafter Chairman Address].
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
33. See id § 78m(h)(7).
34. Chairman Address, supra note 31, at 11546.
35. Id.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6).
37. See id
3M See id
39. See Adam Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments of 1988, 23 INT'L LAW. 755, 759 n.28 (1989).
40. See id at 759 n.27.
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The structure of the original "reason to know" standard of the
FCPA prevented a defendant from avoiding liability by ignoring
reasonable indications that an agent or intermediary engaged in
bribery. 41 The standard forced U.S. companies to examine
potential liability under the FCPA if a local agent engaged in
bribery to gain economic advantages. 42 The Amendments
removed the "reason to know" element, leaving only the element
of "knowing." 43 The standard now reads:
[A] person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result if (i) such person is aware
that the other person is engaging in such conduct, that such
circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to
occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such
circumstance
exists or that such result is substantially certain to
44
occur.

Under this Agreement, a company will not escape liability if it
engaged in willful blindness or deliberate ignorance. 45 A company
can, however, escape liability if the company or individual is
merely guilty of "simple negligence." 46 Although the amended
standard of knowledge is more clearly defined, ambiguities still
exist.

47

The amendments also adjusted the definition of grease
payments. Prior to the amendments, the legality of grease
payments depended on the status of the foreign official who
received the bribe. A corporation could bribe foreign officials who
merely performed ministerial or clerical duties. 48 The 1988
Amendments changed this by defining a grease payment by its
purpose, rather than by the recipient. The 1988 Amendments also
excluded payments to any foreign official to obtain "routine
governmental actions."'49 This amendment may, however, have
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3).
42. See id. § 78dd-l(b) to -2(b).
43. See id § 78dd-2(h)(3).
44. Id
45. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 919, 920 (1988).
46. See id.
47. See Christopher L. Hall, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Competitive Disadvantage,But for How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 289, 299
(1994).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2).
49. See id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
Routine governmental action is an action which is ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official in (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official
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little effect because the intermediaries making the illegal payments
are often unaware that the United States is their client and that
U.S. law prohibits bribes. 50
The 1988 Amendments added two affirmative defenses to the
FCPA provisions. 51 First, the payment of a gift, offer, or promise
of anything of value is lawful, if the written laws and regulations of
the foreign official's country permit such payment. 52 This defense,
however, has little significance because in most countries,
corruption and bribery are still illegal.
Second, it is an affirmative defense if the payment, gift, offer,
or promise of value made was a reasonable and bona fide
expenditure which directly related to:
(1) promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (2)
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government
or agency. 53 Travel and lodging expenses for a foreign official fall
under this defense-if used to reimburse foreign officials for visits
or tours of manufacturing facilities. 54
The SEC and DOJ may impose both criminal and civil
penalties for FCPA violations.55 The SEC is responsible for the
civil enforcement of accounting and reporting violations. In
addition, the SEC seeks to enjoin civil violations by reporting
companies and any related individuals. 56 The DOJ exclusively
controls criminal prosecutions 57 and also has jurisdiction over civil
violations by domestic concerns.
In addition, the DOJ is
responsible for initiating criminal prosecutions of anti-bribery
documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing
governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) processing police
protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading
cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
Id.
50. See Impert, supra note 11, at 1015.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1).
52. See id.
53. See id. § 78dd-1(c)(2) to -2(c)(2).
54. See Impert, supra note 11, at 1016.
55. See FCPA, supra note 7.
56. See Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,478, 1978 SEC Lexis 2210, at 5-8, (Feb. 6, 1978). The SEC can conduct
civil enforcement in the form of investigation, bring civil injunction and administrative
proceedings, and refer cases to the DOJ for criminal prosecutions. See id
57. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 1, 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,4109.
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violations by reporting companies and domestic concerns. 58
The 1988 Amendments doubled the maximum corporate fine
to $2 million, and increased the maximum penalty for an
individual, corporate officer, director, employee, agent, or
stockholder committing a willful violation from $10 thousand to
$100 thousand. 59
In addition, corporate officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockbrokers face five year maximum
sentences for FCPA violations. 60 The regulatory agencies can
impose civil penalties of $10 thousand and injunctive relief against
any company, employee, officer, director, or agent committing a
willful violation of the FCPA. 61 Furthermore, the the 1988 Trade
Act Conference Report states that the FCPA's penalty provisions
do not preempt other statutes that provide for alternative fines. 62
III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INDIA
A. India as a Lucrative Site for ForeignInvestment
India is one of the most attractive and fastest growing markets
in the world.63 Foreign exchange reserves were twenty times
higher in 1996 than they were in 1991. 64 India has the world's
second largest population, fourth largest rail system, seventh
largest land area, and tenth largest economy. 65 Foreigners
invested a record $2.03 billion in the fiscal year ending March 31,
1996.66
In light of its limited resources, India's economic
performance is impressive. 67 The Economist Intelligence Unit's
(EIU) predicted a growth forecast for India during the 1996/97
fiscal year of 5.4%.68 These statistics reflect India's growing
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(d), 78ff(a)-(c).
59. See id § 78dd-2(g).
60. See id
61. See itd §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78dd-2(g)(2)(C), 78ff(c)(1)(B), (2)(C), 78dd-2(d)(1).
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 576, at 924 (1988).
63. See Jack A. Shaw, Two Nations' Unrealized Business Opportunity, INDIA
ABROAD, Sept. 13, 1996, at 3.
64. See id
65. See id.
66. See Peter Waldman & Miriam Jordan, Taking Stock. Fiasco at Indian Blue Chip
Teaches Investors a Lesson, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL-

WSJA 3332526.
67. See Surendra

Kaushik,

India's Democratic Economic

Transformation,

CHALLENGE, Sept. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9035754.

68. See 1196 3rd QUARTER COUNTRY REP. INDIA NEPAL 1, 6 (1996) [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORT].

19981

CorruptPracticesin India

397

economy, making it an attractive site for foreign investment.
In addition, projects estimated at 40 billion rupees (U.S. $1.2
billion) currently await government approval, 69 including investors
such as: Coca-Cola; BMW; Bacardi; Carlsberg; William Grant;
Marie Brizard; Shell Oil; Caltex; and Texas Instruments. 70
Approximately $200 million flows monthly in foreign direct
investment from companies such as PepsiCo, McDonalds, IBM,
Hewlett-Packard, GM, GE, Duracell, Black & Decker, AT&T,
NYNEX, and other blue-chip companies. 71
B. India's PoliticalInstability's Effect on ForeignInvestment
While the Indian government is enthusiastic about attracting
foreign investment, its political instability concerns many potential
investors. 72 For example, the political instability in India caused
Volkswagen to switch the location of a joint venture with Eicher
from India to China. 73 Indian political parties express varying
views on foreign investment. Many parties believe in swadeshi
(self-reliance) and are hostile toward foreign investors and
international institutions, 74 believing foreign investment threatens
existing jobs and worker's rights, others strongly favor foreign
investment because of its positive effect on the economy. Large
Indian businesses also criticize foreign investment as causing
increased and unfair competition. 75 Indian companies pay high
interest rates, while foreign companies access lower rates abroad.76
IV. CORRUPTION IN INDIA

A. Causes of Corruptionin India
World War II (WWII) caused highly unsettled conditions in
India.77 WWII resulted in partition of the country and led to
inflationary conditions which slowed economic stabilization. 78
69. See id. at 27.
70. See id.
71. See Kaushik, supra note 67.
72. See Jayshree Sengupta, Foreign Investors Face Discouraging Problems, INDIA
ABROAD, Sept. 20, 1996, at 2.
73. See COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 68, at 27.
74. See id. at 13.
75. See id. at 18.
76. See id.
77. S.K. GOSH, LAWS RELATING TO BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN INDIA 1 (1971).
78. See id
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Compounding this problem, India spent unprecedented amounts
of money on huge projects to increase services in the nation.
While well-intentioned, these massive projects lacked the
necessary supervision, 79 which led to wide scale corruption. One
author attributes corruption and decline in moral values as a
80
casualty of war.
A poignant example of the level of corruption can be seen in
the Indian Civil Supplies department, where corruption is rampant
in activities such as issuing permits and licenses. 81 Central
Government activities are also affected by bribery and rampant
corruption. 82 It was only a matter of time before this corruption
spread to India's political parties.
Political corruption originated in the 1970s. After a ban on
corporate donations, political parties became corrupt in raising
needed election funds.83 In the late 1970s and 1980s, higher costs
associated with politics made the situation of "black" money
donations worse and led to kickbacks on government contracts. 84
Demands for bribes also became more prevalent at the state
level. Beginning in 1971, state and central government elections
were held separately, thereby doubling the cost of elections.85
Additionally, the central government lost some of its power to
grant licenses for imports and for entrance into certain industries
to state governments. 86 This shift in power allowed state
governments to use their independent power to obtain
kickbacks. 87
The corruption that began after WWII continued into the
1990s as a product of tradition, environment, economics, and lack
of public condemnation.88 Currently, many gaps exist in the law
79. See id
80. See id
81. See id at 2.
82. See id Corruption is on the rise in the following departments and organizations:
Railway, Income Tax, Central Excise and Customs, Military Engineering Service,
Defense Production Organization, Central Public Works, Life Insurance, and Air Lines
Corporation. See id
83. Prosecutions May Reverse the Tide of Corruption, INDIA Bus. INTELLIGENCE,
Jan. 24, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 8327780 [hereinafter Prosecutions].
84. See id
85. See id.
86. See T. Thomas, Lessons From Enron, ASIAN WALL ST. J., January 30, 1996,
available in 1996 WL-WSJA 3325955.
87. See Prosecutions,supra note 83.
88. See GOSH, supra note 77, at 3.
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which create opportunities for corruption. In addition, rampant
poverty in India contributes to corruption because economically
deprived individuals more easily fall victim to the temptation of
bribes. 89 Government workers, however, tend to earn more than
the average citizen and their economic status cannot be the basis
for the corruption in which they engage. A hawala, or an illegal
foreign exchange dealer, claimed to have paid bribes in exchange
for favors to more than 100 bureaucrats, ruling party, and
opposition politicians.
Clearly, the system of kickbacks and commissions decreases
the amount and quality of investment needed in India. Bribes
increase production costs, thus, neutralizing the cost advantage of
doing business in a developing country. 90 Not only does bribery
reduce the cost effectiveness of foreign investment in India, but it
also exposes American companies to criminal liability under the
FCPA. 91
B. Indian.Laws Regarding Corruptionand Bribery
Indian law does condemn bribery, though these laws are
frequently ignored. The Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of
Corruption Act of 1947 are the principal statutes prohibiting
corruption and bribery.
1. Indian Penal Code
The Indian Penal Code contains three specific sections which
prohibit bribery. Indian Penal Code, section 161 prohibits public
servants from taking illegal bribes. 92 Under this section, public
servants who accept any gratuity to influence the exercise of their
official functions face imprisonment of up to three years, a fine, or
both.93 It also defines such terms as, public servant, gratification,
and bribes. 94 For a gratuity to constitute a bribe, it is not necessary
that the motive be corrupt or oppressive, or that the recipient
appropriated the money. 95 The commentary includes analogous
laws, procedure and practice, and describes the proof necessary to
89. See id
90. See id
91. See supra Part II.
92. See JASPAL SINGH, THE INDIA PENAL CODE 545 (1994).
93. See H.P. VARSHNI, LAW OF BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 37 (1963).
94. See SINGH, supra note 92, at 545.

95. See id at 546-47.
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96
sustain a charge of bribery.
Section 162 forbids taking a gratuity by corrupt or illegal
means in order to influence a public servant. 97 Section 165
condemns a public servant who obtains valuable things without
consideration from a person who transacts business with the public
servant. 98 Specifically, it provides that any public servant who:
[A]ccepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing without
consideration, or for a consideration which he knows to be
inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or
to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or
business transacted or about to be transacted by such public
servant, or having any connection with the official functions of
himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or
from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related
to the person so concerned, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine, or with both.99
The proceeding or business referred to in Section 165 must be
a transaction by the public servant. If the transaction is not
conducted by him personally, it must have some connection with
the official functions he performs. 100 The wording of Section 165
is vague enough to include proceedings or business conducted
through a court or public office as well as business conducted by
subordinates under the immediate direction of the official
supervisor. 101 As noted, most of the Indian laws dealing with
bribery relate to acceptanceof a bribe and not to the act of giving a
bribe for favored treatment. Most foreign companies, therefore,
still make bribes as they do not fear prosecution under Indian law.

2. Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947
After India gained independence from Britain, the Indian
legislature passed the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 which
modified sections of the Indian Penal Code. 10 2 In 1962, the
96. See id. at 550.
97. See id at 555 (wording is similar to Indian Penal Code Section 161).
98. See id at 559.
99. Id.
i00. See id
101. See id. at 547.
102. See LESLIE PALMIER, THE CONTROL OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION: CASE
STUDIES INASIA 13 (1985).
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government formed the Committee on Prevention of Corruption
to review anti-corruption legislation and to make suggestions to
increase their effectiveness. 10 3 This committee gave rise to other
groups such as the Administrative Vigilance Division (AVD), the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC). The function of the CVC is essentially
investigatory while the CBI has the function of both investigation
and prosecution. 1°4
Although India has taken steps to deal with internal
corruption, its laws only address corruption among public servants.
Bribery is an offense under the Indian Penal Code only when it
105 It
deals with persons who are, or expect to be public servants.
does not refer to others who accept bribes in the course of
business. Bribery, therefore, continues to pose a problem for U.S.
companies doing business in India.
C. Recent Corruption Scandals in India
Many scandals have recently been exposed in India. P.V.
Narashima Rao's government has had a history of bribery
scandals. In 1983, an expatriate businessman alleged that he paid
$100 thousand to a Rao acquaintance in a failed bid to win a state
contract.1 06 In addition, the CBI also questioned the prime
minister's son regarding a $40 million kickback scandal linked to
fertilizer imports from Turkey. 107
Other major scandals have also affected foreign investment in
India. In 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's government
allegedly accepted kickbacks from AB Bofors, a Swedish arms
manufacturer, to secure a $1.3 billion artillery contract. 108 India's
most significant financial scandal erupted in April 1992. Banks
and brokers colluded illegally to siphon $1.3 billion from the interbank securities market to fuel the Bombay Stock Exchange. 109
In another incident, the police accused Prime Minister Rao of
buying votes. The alleged vote-buying occurred during the 1993
no-confidence motion in Parliament, which Rao's then minority
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id.
See id at 15.
See VARSHNI, supra note 93, at 1.
See id
See id
See id
See id.
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government won by a thin margin. 110 Furthermore, in January
1996, an $18 million political bribery scandal resulted in the
111
resignation of seven of Rao's ministers and two governors.
They faced bribery charges brought by the CBI regarding an illegal
112
foreign exchange scandal.
Sukh Ram, Communications Minister in the Rao government,
faces allegations that he illegally issued basic and cellular
telecommunication licenses to private parties. 113 The CBI accused
Sukh Ram of accepting kickbacks from a company which sold
radio equipment to the government. 1 4 The CBI discovered
roughly 36 million rupees (US $1 million) hidden in Sukh Ram's
New Delhi and Mandi houses. 115 He is also accused of favoring a
little-known telecommunications firm, from his home state,
Himachal Futuristic Communications Limited (HFCL), by
granting them licenses for basic and cellular telecommunication
services.
D. Effect of Corruptionon ForeignInvestment in the
Telecommunication and Power Sector
As previously discussed, a company is exposed to FCPA
liability if they are "aware of a high probability of the existence of
[the] circumstances [for improper payment]. 11 6 One factor in
establishing whether a company or individual is aware of a "high
probability" of such circumstances is when the country in question
has a recognized problem with bribery. 117 Many U.S. companies
are deterred from doing business in countries, such as India, which
have well-documented cases of corruption because of the threat of
FCPA liability.
Corruption has the most adverse impact on foreign investors
in the telecommunications and power industries 118 because these
110. See id
111. See A Major Scandal a Year, INDIA POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A12.
112. Narayanan Madhavan, Rift Seen Between Rao, Manmohan Over Scams, INDIA
WEST, Sept. 20, 1996, at A8.
113. See Nikhil Chakravartty, Sukh Ram Scam Is a Matter of Shame, Concern, INDIA
WEST, Sept. 6, 1996, at A4.
114. See Sukh Ram Arrested by CBI in Telecom Scandal, INDIA WEST, Sept. 20, 1996,
at A15 [hereinafter Sukh Ram Arrested].
115. See id
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
117. See Executive Legal Summary, Bribery Provisions of the FCPA, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, Vol. 1, Apr. 1995, at 100.007.
11& See Sukh Ram Arrested, supra note 114, at A15.
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sectors offer the highest investment return for foreign
companies.'1 9 Due to the numerous scandals of corruption,
foreign investors may be reluctant to begin operations in India.
There are reports that many foreign investors in cellular and basic
services are not paying license fees necessary to commence
operations. 120 These scandals have further deterred many
American companies from doing business in India. 121
The Indian telecommunications sector is poorly developed
with an average of eighty-five people per telephone connection. 122
In May 1994, the telecommunications sector opened to private
enterprise through the National Telecom Policy. 123
The
government, however, continued to maintain regulatory powers
over the telecommunications sector. 124 The basic idea was to
enable the government to collect about 1 trillion rupees
(approximately U.S. $28 billion) in license fees to improve existing
facilities. 125 The power to grant licenses, however, lies with the
Communications Ministry, whose officials often divert the money
for personal gain. Naturally, this makes foreign investors hesitant
to invest in India.
As a result of the Sukh Ram scandal, telecommunication
companies face difficulties in securing investors to help finance
their huge commitments in basic and cellular services in India. 126
Investors are wary of putting their money in potentially tainted
companies. For example, HFCL made commitments to pay a
license fee of 27,795 crore rupees (approximately U.S. $7 billion)
over fifteen years for its basic service networks. 127 To raise its
share of the funds, the company planned to sell a large part of its
equity at a huge premium. Because of the corruption scandals,
however, HFCL faces serious difficulties in getting investors to
119. John Elliot, India's Slide Into Sleeze, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, available
in 1995 WL-WSJA 10228169.
120. See Sengupta, supra note 73, at 2.
121. See American Investors Wary of India, Says US. Diplomat, INDIA J., Sept. 13,
1996, at C4. Jonathan M. Bensky, US Commercial Counselor, says that investors view
India as "high risk business," and further states that "corruption is a fact in India which is
a major concern for several US business houses." Id.
122. See Sengupta, supra note 72, at 2.
123. See id
124. See id
125. See id
126. See The Priceof Corruption,INDIA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Price
of Corruption].
127. See id
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commit funds for the project. 128
In 1993, the media reported that a U.S. company lost a power
project to a European competitor because-it refused to pay a thirty
million dollar bribe to a chief minister. 129 Such corrupt practices
have resulted in poorly constructed and unreliable power sources
which have led to widespread power shortages. These power
shortages compound the problem and further deter foreign
investment.130
Moreover, the process of approving power projects is very
inefficient.131 Approval for such projects must be given by the
Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs, which must initially clear
all projects, and by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board,
which must clear all large projects.132 The projects are then
subject to review by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), the
Finance Ministry, and the Environment Ministry. 133 Lack of
coordination among these governmental entities commonly leads
to long delays in the approval process. 34 A "fast track" system,
however, will soon be used to accelerate the process for approving
projects which have a capacity of up to 250 megawatts and a cost
of 10 billion rupees (about U.S. $280 million). 135
To address India's power shortage problem, the central
government approved the Enron power plant construction. 136 The
Dabhol Power Company project was 100% foreign-owned with
"Enron as energy supplier, General Electric as equipment
supplier, and Bechtel as the building contractor. 1 37 Enron has
had great difficulty doing business in India and abiding by the
FCPA. Notwithstanding their compliance with the FCPA, Enron
was accused of violating the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian
Electricity Distribution Act. 138
Enron allegedly received the power plant contract without
128. See id
129. See Elliot, supra note 119.
130. See Sengupta, supra note 72, at 2.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id
134. See id.
135. See itt
136. See Kaushik, supra note 67.
137. See Thomas,supra note 86.
138. See Dabhol/Enron Dispute Reaches the Brink, POWER ASIA, July 10, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 8527651 [hereinafter Dabhol/Enron].
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following the normal competitive bidding process and without
gaining the approval of the Maharashtra state government, where
the plant was to be constructed. 139 The new city leaders called the
deal corrupt, even though it had been approved by the previous
state government. 140 They did not like the proposed cost of the
power plant and requested that the contract be re-negotiated using
a proper competitive bidding process. 141 They claimed the
sponsors "should not be paid a single penny,"' 142 alleging that
Enron paid bribes to obtain approval permits for the power
143
project.
Many Indians believed that a $920 million project could not
be approved without resorting to bribery. 144 At this point, the
Enron joint venture had already expended $400 million toward the
project. Enron CEO, Rebecca Mar, commented that the "project
shall not fall victim to local politics."'1 45 After examining the
project, the U.S. government stated it had no reason to suspect
that Enron had violated the FCPA.146 In reality, this proved to be
a political fight between the central and state government,
resulting in foreign investors losing confidence in India's
investment opportunities. 147 Subsequently, Enron and the state
government agreed to a new contract with a new pricing structure
for the distribution of power to the consumers. 148
V. BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF THE FCPA

Many U.S. companies perceive the FCPA as a competitive
disadvantage because the conduct prohibited by the FCPA is not
illegal in other countries. For example, paying bribes is still legal
throughout Europe. 149 But even more troublesome for U.S.
companies is that for citizens and companies in Japan, Germany,
and Britain, bribery of foreign officials is not only legal, but also
139. See Kaushik, supra note 67.
140. See Christopher Thomas, Mutton on the Menu at India's McDonald's, TIMES
(London), Jan. 12, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 6466522.
141. See Kaushik, supra note 67.
142. See id
143. See Elliott, supra note 119.
144. See id
145. Dahbol/Enron, supra note 138.
146. See id.
147. Kaushik, supra note 67.
148. See id.
149. See Need to Tap InstitutionalInvestors for Power Projects Seen as Critical,INDEP.
POWER REP., Oct. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8120522.
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tax-deductible. 150 As such, U.S. companies often lose contracts to
foreign competitors who are allowed to bribe foreign officials to
secure a deal.
Dissatisfied with the FCPA, many companies and banks pay
foreign representatives large salaries to indirectly finance the
bribes. 151 Additionally, U.S. companies often adopt joint venture
partners who can make payments unilaterally, thus allowing the
U.S. companies to later claim ignorance of the details. U.S.
companies are taking these measures because of the multitude of
opportunities arising in corrupt countries.
Others believe, however, that the FCPA has not caused U.S.
businesses to suffer. A study by John Graham and Mark McKean
of the University of Southern California and the University of
California, Irvine, respectively, compared the United States' share
of exports in countries characterized as corrupt with the share in
countries considered to be non-corrupt. 152 Although far from
conclusive, the study showed that U.S. exports were roughly
equivalent in both types of countries during 1977-1984.153
Furthermore, many argue that the United States and its
companies should maintain honesty and fair dealing in its foreign
business transactions, even if it is economically disadvantageous.
They believe illicit payments undermine the values upon which
democratic nations thrive. Bribery causes political instability and
interferes with foreign policy. Foreign corrupt payments also
produce waste and distort prices in the host foreign countriesbecause the corrupt foreign official often makes decisions out of
self-interest to the detriment of the country's economy. 154
VI. INDIA'S EFFORTS To COMBAT CORRUPTION

India recognizes that their current laws are ineffective in
preventing and punishing bribery and corruption, and that bribery
scares away potential foreign investors, especially U.S. companies.
Indian legislatures and country leaders are suggesting new
solutions to the problem. Prime Minister Deve Gowda is
considering introducing a bill establishing an ombudsman to
150. See On the Take, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988.
151. See Elliott, supra note 119.
152. See Hall, supra note 47, at 299 citing On the Take, The Economist, Nov. 19, 1988.
153. See id.
154. See The Political Scene: Corruption is Spreading, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, June 1, 1993.
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spearhead the effort to remove corruption in India. 155 The effort
may be futile, however, because this is the sixth time that
Parliament has introduced such a bill in the last twenty-eight years,
156
all to no avail.
VII. THE PRACTICALITY OF SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Both U.S. and Indian law should address the problem of
corruption in India. First, Congress should not abolish the FCPA
merely because it does not eliminate the problem of corruption
plaguing third world countries, such as India. The United States
should continue to stand firm and pressure international agencies
to implement international laws prohibiting bribery of foreign
officials. 157 More importantly, as a world leader, the United States
needs to urge other countries to support and comply with
proposed international laws regulating bribery of foreign officials.
The United States must demonstrate the benefits of these
proposed international laws that are equivalent to the FCPA.
Secondly, India needs to take a tougher stance against
corruption and bribery to keep foreign investors interested in
India. The legislature needs to amend the laws to punish not only
public servants who receive bribes, but also those businesses and
companies who offer the bribes. The government needs to enforce
the laws, and strengthen the fines and sentencing of such
violations.
In addition, the number of intermediaries involved in
procedures, such as granting licenses, should be reduced.
Reducing the number of intermediaries will eliminate the
loopholes where corruption and bribery most often occur. Laws
should also require the consent or authorization of more than one
person for non-clerical decisions.
Such procedures make
corruption more difficult because the corruption requires
collaboration and, initiates a system of checks and balances.
Implementation and consistent enforcement of such laws and
procedural changes will cause companies to fear discovery and
punishment.
Therefore, they are less likely to engage in
corruption and bribery.
155. See Anti-Corruption Bill for Parliament, Says PM, INDIA POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at
A6.
156. See id
157. For a discussion of international efforts to fight corruption, see Hall, supra note
47, at 313.
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India should also create a state fund to finance the expenses
of recognized political parties. 158 Corruption has had a major
impact as political parties look for alternative sources to raise
election funds. 159 Creating a state fund and implementing policies
that set limits on campaign costs would reduce the incentive for
obtaining black market money.
The Indian government can also make the process of
privatization more "transparent.' 1 60
This involves the
continuation and expansion of competitive bidding, and possibly
the introduction of the U.S. practice of holding public hearings,
where all information on the project is available for scrutiny. 161
The information becomes a matter of public record and may help
provide a check on illegal behavior.
Other options exist for U.S. companies to deal with the FCPA
when doing business in India and while the above actions are
pending. For example, an alliance with a local Indian partner is
helpful because the partner can cut through the red tape without
resorting to bribery. 162 Projects in politically sensitive sectors,
such as the power or telecommunications sectors, benefit
particularly from shared ownership. 163 The Indian partners' local
status sometimes gives them a business advantage without
resorting to bribery.
Another suggestion is for U.S. companies to use "legal bribery
as an alternative to kickbacks and normal monetary bribes."' 164
"Legal bribery" is offering benefits such as information on new
technologies, prestige, recognition, or donations to local charities
as a bargaining tool in obtaining a contract in a developing country
such as India. 165
Most importantly, U.S. companies must inform employees of
FCPA provisions. Employees need to be aware of what actions
violate the FCPA and then avoid such activity. Moreover, the
companies need to train their employees in how to avoid falling
prey to bribery in foreign countries while still securing contracts.
158. See Prosecutions,supra note 83.
159. See supra Part IV.A.
160. See Price of Corruption,supra note 126.
161. See id.
162. See Rajesh Kumar, Order Amid Chaos: Doing Business In India, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 10214147.
163. See id
164. See Poon, supra note 20, at 353.
165. See id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

If U.S. companies continue to support bribing of foreign
political officials, it will undermine the democratic process and
economic and political development of the foreign country, in
exchange for U.S. economic gain. Such behavior is properly
condemned by the United States through the FCPA. Despite the
problems of corruption and bribery facing the country, India is still
a lucrative site for foreign investment. Furthermore, some reforms
have taken place in India. Recently, a large number of politicians
were prosecuted for receiving kickbacks on deals signed by their
ministries. These recent government prosecutions are beginning
to unravel the damage caused by twenty-five years of corruption in
India. 166 This has begun to increase foreign confidence and
investment in India. In addition to other viable solutions, these
current efforts to combat the problem will pave the way for U.S.
companies to successfully invest in India without violating the
FCPA.
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